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ALABAMA’S POLITICAL LEADERS
AND THE ACQUISITION OF FLORIDA
by HUGH  C. BAILEY
F MANY  AMERICANS  were concerned with western expansion
in 1819, it is equally true that many were greatly interested
in expansion to the south. America’s spirit of ‘‘manifest destiny”
was by no means blunted with the purchase of Louisiana, and
at the time of Alabama’s admission to the Union the question of
the acquisition and disposition of Florida had become a major
issue. Nowhere was the concern greater than among the group
which dominated the early years of Alabama’s political life, “the
Georgia Machine.” Composed of former Georgians, many of whom
originally came from Virginia, the “machine” was nurtured and
directed from Washington by Secretary of the Treasury William
H. Crawford. He and such Alabama “Georgians” as the former
Georgia senators Charles Tait and William Wyatt Bibb were quite
familiar with the efforts which had been made for Southern
expansion. 1
They knew that as early as 1805 Jefferson had asked Con-
gress for a two million dollar appropriation to be used as an aid
in the negotiations to obtain West Florida. Contact with Napo-
leon, however, had produced no results, but between 1810 and
1813 revolution and military force procured West Florida from
the Perdido River to the Mississippi for the young nation.
American nationalism had been accentuated by the War of
1812 at a time when Spanish strength was declining as a result of
the Spanish-American revolutions. The Spanish foreign minister,
Pizarro, “feared that some sudden move of the United States
might bring on a war that would ruin Spain in America once and
forever.” 2 Therefore he decided to let the United States have
Florida in return for which he hoped to receive a pledge from
1. The author has dealt fully with the dominance of the “Georgia
Machine” in “John W. Walker and the ‘Georgia Machine’ in Early
Alabama Politics.” The Alabama  Review, VIII (July, 1955), 179-195.
2. Samuel Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American
Foreign Policy, (New York, 1949), 307.
[ 17 ]
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the American government not to recognize any of the revolted
provinces in Spanish America. To achieve this goal, the Spanish
Minister to the United States, Don Luis de Onis y Gonzales,
opened negotiations early in 1818.
These negotiations were interrupted in the spring of 1818
by Andrew Jackson’s Florida expedition. Late in 1817 the hero
of the Battle of New Orleans had been commissioned by the
United States government to punish the Seminoles whose raids
into American territory and provision of haven for escaped slaves
had become quite an annoyance, and was authorized to pursue
them across the Spanish border if necessary. With characteristic
vigor, Jackson seized the posts of St. Marks and Pensacola, tried
and executed two British citizens, deposed the Spanish governor,
naming an American in his place, and burned the Spanish
archives.
Onis demanded a return of Florida to Spanish authority, an
indemnity for the episode, and punishment of Jackson. Yet he
continued to discuss the potential treaty with Secretary of State
John Quincy Adams on the assumption that Florida would be re-
stored. 3
Secretary of War John C. Calhoun wrote his good friend,
Charles Tait, former Senator from Georgia and now Alabama’s
first United States District Judge, that Jackson’s action was “un-
authorized, and done . . . on his own responsibility.” Such being
the case the captured areas would, of course, be returned to
Spain. Though not a pacifist, Calhoun was extremely anxious to
avoid war over the Florida question. “We have nothing to gain
in a Spanish War and much to lose,” he declared. “Should the
contest be confined to Spain and us, our commerce must pass
from us to the neutral powers, particularly England. Should
other powers be involved, and the war general, the wisest man
cannot see its result. We must suffer. We want Time. Let us
grow.” 4 Tait later was to mirror this same reasoning in his ad-
vice to John W. Walker, Alabama’s “Georgia” member of the




Bemis, op. cit., 300-316.
John C. Calhoun to Charles A. Tait, July 20, 1818, Charles A. Tait
Papers, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery,
hereinafter cited as Tait Papers, Montgomery.
In order to quiet opposition Alabama’s “Georgia Machine” allowed
the second U.S. Senator from the state to be chosen outside its ranks.
The office went to William Rufus King, who was elected Vice-Presi-
dent of the United States in 1854.
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Holding these views, Secretary Calhoun was greatly con-
cerned over any provocative action such as that taken by Jackson.
Once he had received Tait’s views on the subject, he spoke more
freely, but in a confidential manner. 6 “It is indispensable that the
military should on all occasions be held subordinate to orders:
and, I know of no excuses except necessity that ought to exempt
from punishment disobedience to orders,” Calhoun held. If this
were true why had Jackson not been punished?
Calhoun’s answer to this question does not indicate his
stand in the cabinet for court martialing Jackson. He diplomatic-
ally informed Tait that the reason for the administration’s action
was “adversity of opinion, as to the character of his (Jackson’s)
conduct.” Some held that the General had received orders which
he believed were from the President authorizing the action he
had taken. “When to this was added the misconduct of the
Spanish authority in Florida and the relation of this country with
Spain, it was thought it would be highly improper to order any
proceedings against the General.” “Such was the diversity of view
taken on this subject,” Calhoun wrote, that it would “render it,
perhaps, improper, to take the high toned course; as that ought
not to be resorted to, but in a case free from doubt.” 7
Reflecting an adverse attitude toward Jackson which was al-
ways held by many of the “Georgia” political clique, Territorial
Governor William Wyatt Bibb of Alabama disagreed with Cal-
houn. “In apologizing for General Jackson,” he held, the govern-
mental leaders “have erred most egregiously.” Bibb felt that they
would gain nothing by it with Jackson’s friends, and, at the same
time, that they would “lose much with the thinking part of the
Nation.” “Not a moment should have been lost in arresting the
Genl. and thereby showing a just regard to the preservation of
our constitution,” the Governor wrote. “No man should be per-
mitted in a free country to usurp the whole powers of the whole
government and to treat with contempt all authority except that
of his own will.” 8
6. Calhoun to Tait, September 5, 1818, Tait Papers, Montgomery. “Your
train of reflections in relation to Jackson and Pensacola is such as I
expected,” the Secretary wrote. At the end of his letter he observed,
“I have spoken to you freely on this interesting subject. You will
consider it between ourselves.”
7. Id. to id., ibid.
8. William W. Bibb to Tait, September 19, 1818, Tait Papers, Mont-
gomery.
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In this opinion Bibb undoubtedly reflected the views of the
great national patron and godfather of Alabama’s “Georgia Ma-
chine,” Secretary of the Treasury William H. Crawford. A lead-
ing presidential candidate even in 1818, Crawford had joined
Calhoun in staunch opposition to Jackson in the cabinet dispute
over the Florida fiasco. Jackson, however, lay under no such
misapprehensions as to Crawford’s attitude as he did in the case
of Calhoun. Therefore the bitterness between Crawford and
Jackson became of immediate political import.
The election of a United States Senator in Tennessee in
1819 “was conducted with particular reference to the supposed
quarrel between the Genl. and myself,” Crawford wrote. “What
ought to be done with this Man? He is not inferior to the
Georgia Genl. [John Clark] 9 in depravity and vindictiveness,
and superior to him in talents and address.”
The Treasury Secretary avowed that he had no direct
quarrel with Jackson. Searching his own actions, he could find
the only source of offense to be his indifference to the anger
Jackson had shown toward him, evidently produced by Crawford’s
stand on the Florida episode. 10
Although before 1824 Crawford personally tended to dis-
count Jackson’s political strength, 11 some of his followers did not
share these views and regretted that the “Florida Dispute” was
not better exploited politically. As late as March, 1822, Georgia
Congressman Thomas W. Cobb wrote that he believed that Jack-
son was the third person in a trio composed of Georgia’s Gover-
nor John Clark, Calhoun and Jackson formed to defeat Craw-
ford’s presidential ambitions. “A glorious chance to dissolve this




John Clark was the leader of the “popular” party in Georgia which
opposed the powerful Crawford-Troup forces which was widely
known as the aristocratic party of “the Virginians and their allies.”
See John E. Shipp, Giant Days or the Life and Times of William H.
Crawford, Embracing also Excerpts from His Diary, Letters and
Speeches, together with a Copious Index to the Whole, (Americus,
1909), 30-33, 68; also E. Merton Coulter, Georgia, A Short History,
(Chapel Hill, 1947), 239-240.
William H. Crawford to Tait, November 15, 1819, Tait Papers,
Montgomery.
Id. to id., September 17, 1822, ibid. Crawford held that the nomi-
nation of Jackson by the Tennessee Legislature “can produce no
effect whatever, unless it should effect the election of Colonel
Williams to the senate. I am fearful that it was intended more for
that purpose than any other. There is no other state in the Union
that will take him for President.”
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of “the late Florida transactions Jackson would have been ruined,”
the congressman felt. 12
Though Jackson had severe critics in the cabinet and the
Congress, Secretary of State Adams eloquently defended his ac-
tions, in effect contending “Spain must either exercise responsible
authority in the derelict province or cede it to the United States.”
With this warning, Florida was returned to Spain. Shortly there-
after, the Marquis de Yrujo, the new Spanish Foreign Minister,
instructed Onis to grant Florida to the United States and to
settle the “whole territorial question as best he could preferably
by running the [western] boundary along the Missouri to its
source and thence to the ocean as far north as possible.”
The Spanish envoy received this carte blanche on January 4,
1819. Sensing the weakness of his position, he fought a valiant
rear-guard action. Finally on Washington’s birthday, February
22, 1819, he formally signed the Adams-Onis Treaty which ceded
Florida to the United States and fixed a transcontinental boundary
line between the United States and Spanish territory west of the
Mississippi River. Two days after this, the Senate, by unanimous
consent, gave its approval to one of the greatest diplomatic tri-
umphs in American history. 1 3 It appeared that the Florida ques-
tion had been settled, but, as Senator John W. Walker prepared
to assume his position in the Senate upon the admission of Ala-
bama, the entire affair was again thrown in the hands of the
American government. 
Although the powers under which Onis signed the treaty
contained a pledge that the Spanish King would approve any
treaty negotiated by his plenipotentiary, the Council of State ob-
jected when the document reached Madrid. It pointed out that
it contained no guarantee against the recognition of the independ-
ence of the Latin American states, no promise of the United
States to better enforce its neutrality laws, while in the Council’s
opinion, too much territory had been ceded. Overawed by such
a report, the King dispatched General Francisco Dionisio Vives
to Washington to see if he could obtain more favorable terms.
As time passed the impatience of the American people grew
greater. Senator Walker from his Washington vantage point
was sensitive to this and conscious of its influence on the govern-
12. Thomas W. Cobb to Tait, March 8, 1822, Tait Papers, Montgomery.
13.  Bemis, op. cit., 317-340.
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mental officials. Secretary Adams was disgusted, feeling that the
President’s “sympathetic Latin-American Policy” had destroyed his
fine handiwork. He urged Monroe to advise Congress to occupy
the Floridas by force. Henry Clay, at this time Speaker of the
House, was jubilant since he felt Spain had saved the United
States from an unprofitable deal. From the House chamber, he
demanded that the United States occupy both Florida and
Texas. 14  The cry for action was heard everywhere. Secretary
of the Treasury Crawford felt (November, 1819) that there was
no intention of making Spanish refusal to ratify the treaty a cause
of war; yet he believed that the Floridas would be occupied and,
at the same time, a declaration would be issued stating “that war
is not intended - that we shall limit our views to the accomplish-
ment of what Spain ought to have done for us.” By this means
he presumed war would be avoided. 15
Judge Charles Tait, who shared his wisdom with Senator
Walker on every major issue, viewed the question with the great-
est solicitude. He sincerely hoped that war, “the last resort of
nations,” could be avoided; yet, if it should come, he felt that
the United States must be ready to respond with “promptitude
& . . . unanimity.” He feared, reflecting Calhoun’s views, that
such a war would be “disastrous” to the United States since its
navigation would be sacrificed and its commerce would “become
the prey of the privateering interests of all Europe”
He felt that the American Navy was much too small to
protect the country’s maritime interests, “spread,” as they were
“over every sea.” Nor had it been ten times its current strength,
it could not have protected American shipping. Should war
come, “the British, the Dutch, the Dane, the Swede &c” would
use the Spanish flag to attack American shipping, until, Tait
feared, within a few years, “the American flag would (except
on board a national ship) be a rarity on the Ocean.”
Tait felt that great pressure would be exerted for war by all
the Florida speculators, “all persons who expect contracts & fat
jobs; all the military by land & sea who honestly pant for action
& an opportunity to distinguish themselves,” and many others.
But he wondered if these special groups represented “the interest
of the nation.”
14. Ibid., 350; John W. Walker to Tait, December 20, 1819, Tait
Papers, Montgomery.
15. Crawford to Tait, November 15, 1819, Tait Papers, Montgomery.
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The former Senator, however, was no advocate of “peace,
at any price.” He proposed the occupancy of so much of Florida
“as may be necessary to secure us against Indian depredation.”
Once this was done American negotiation could go forward “on
a solid basis,” since the republic would have “one foot on Florida
& the other on Texas bestriding the gulf of Mexico.” 16
Senator Walker deprecated a Spanish war, but felt that Tait’s
views were “perfectly correct.” Should war come he could foresee
only an annihilation of American commerce, since it would be
“a war not so much of Spanish, but of commercial Europe.” He
felt that, “every rascal pecaroon of every nation would hoist the
Spanish cross.” The course of wisdom, then, was for the United
States not to loose a Spanish war if it could be avoided with
honor.
The Alabama senator believed that no one “seriously pro-
poses that it [war] shall be proclaimed by us, but it may grow
out of the measures which we adopt.” 17 On December 7, 1819,
President Monroe, in his annual “State of the Union” message,
asked Congress for authority to take over Florida, whereupon the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported such a bill. This
policy was countered by Henry Clay who introduced two resolu-
tions in the “Committee of the Whole” stating that only Congress
has power to cede territory which belongs to the United States
(referring to Texas, in this instance) and that the equivalent in
the Adams-Onis Treaty for that part of Louisiana west of the
Sabine River was inadequate and that that area should not be
transferred to any foreign power or the treaty renewed. 18
Walker wondered what would be the result of an attempt to
execute the President’s policy, and, if something of this nature
were not done, if the government would abandon the treaty, and
“consider ourselves remitted to our ancient title, and take posses-
sion of Texas by virtue of the Louisiana treaty.”
Both courses had their advocates. Walker felt sure that if
Monroe’s policy were adopted, it would be done with modifica-
tions; perhaps, a time would be set for Spanish concurrence beyond
16. Tait to Walker, November 15, 19, 1819, John W. Walker Papers,
Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, herein-
after cited as Walker Papers, Montgomery.
17. Walker to Tait, December 20, 1819, Tait Papers, Montgomery.
18. See Bemis, op. cit., 351.
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which no explanation [sic] will be allowed, no grace accorded.”
Meanwhile one could only wait and hope. 19
Clay’s resolutions never emerged from the “Committee of
the Whole.” They may have influenced the President’s thinking,
however. On Adams’ advice, he sent a special message to Con-
gress on March 27, 1820, suggesting that it delay action on his
recommendations until the next session, allowing time for a new
Spanish minister to arrive. Simultaneously, Secretary Adams
informed the Georgia leader, John Forsyth, the United States’
new Minister to Spain (1819-1823), that if Spanish approval
of the Adams-Onis Treaty were withheld “the United States
would insist upon further indemnity, and would reassert ‘and
never again relinquish’ its rights to a western boundary at the Rio
Grande del Norte.” 20
Forsyth’s mission proved notably unsuccessful. Israel Pickens,
the future Alabama governor, though a friend of Forsyth, felt
that had he “used a little more of the suaviter in modo, & left the
fortiter to the government at home” he might have obtained better
results. 21
Judge Tait believed that his former colleague had permitted
himself “to depart from the usual style, & temper, & courtesy in
Diplomatic affairs.” Tait did not question his motives, and, in
an obvious reference to Jackson, wondered why “sh. not the same
rule be applied to the man who runs riot in civil matters as to
him who violates all Laws in Millitary [sic] affairs.” He hoped
that Forsyth would be permitted “to go off even with eclat in
consideration 1st that he has only bullied Spain & 2d because
his motive was good.”
On a bit more reflection, Tait came to feel that Forsyth
should be called home at once, since he could do no possible good
in Madrid. The former senator was sorry for him since he had
“subjected himself to the imputation of hunting for popularity
through his diplomatic agency.” He hoped that the government
would “take care” of the “diplomat” after his return home. 22
When Senator Walker heard reports that Forsyth was re-
turning home, he was sure that the diplomat must have been re-
19. Walker to Tait,, December 20, 1819, Tait
See Bemis, op. cit., 351 ff.
Papers, Montgomery.
20.
21. Israel Pickens to Walker, January 27, 1820 Walker Papers, Mont- gomery.      
22. Tait to Walker, February 29, 1820, ibid.
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called; at least, he felt, he should have been. Shortly after this
Don Francis de Dionisysio do Vives arrived in Washington (April
9) and a rumor flooded the city to the effect that he had brought
the ratified treaty with him. By the 17th, however, it was agreed
by the “secret-finders” that the Don had not brought the treaty
“ratified by his adored master.” Rumor then began to hold that
he had received the power to agree to a new treaty which would
enable the “instant possession of the Floridas” to be given the
United States upon its concurrence. 23
General Vives soon made known Spain’s demands for rati-
fication. These included a strengthening of the neutrality laws,
a guarantee of Spain’s possessions in the western hemisphere and
a pledge by the United States not to recognize any of the revolt-
ing Spanish-American colonies. Secretary Adams flatly refused
these terms, holding that the United States had pursued a neutral
policy and that to give pledges never to recognize the independ-
ence of the revolting colonies would be a violation of neutrality. 24
Senator Walker preferred to wait and see what would hap-
pen, but he had no fear of war during the current session of Con-
gress. “No body is mad enough just now to fight for Florida,” he
wrote. Besides, “Our sinews are unstrung. Our war-chest is as
empty as an exhausted receiver [reservoir]. The treasury . . . is
minus even for the peace establishment.” In such a condition,
the United States would not precipitate war. 25
As the session closed in May, 1820, the Alabama senator
bemoaned the fact that no major developments had taken place
on the Florida issue. Not only had the nation not taken Florida,
but it did not “rest authority in the President to do so contingent-
ly. ‘Our poverty, and not our will, consents’,” Walker wrote, as
he returned home. 26
But again European distresses came to America’s aid. Soon
after Vives left Madrid, a liberal revolution took place. This,
together with the danger that the United States might seize
Florida - and even Texas should Clay’s views prevail - led to a
reversal of policy. Isolated in Europe and threatened in America,
the Council of States now favored ratification, and the “new
23. Walker to Tait, April 17, 1820, Tait Papers, Montgomery.
24. Bemis, op. cit., 351-352.
25. WaIker to Tait, April 17, 1820, Tait Papers, Montgomery.
26. Id. to id., May 14, 1820, ibid.
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constitutional Cortes” gave its approval in secret on September
30, 1820, at the same time annulling its Florida land grants.
The King signed the treaty October 24, 1820. 27
The revolution would appear also to have had effects on
American policy. Had it not occurred, Secretary of War Calhoun
believed that “there would have been little, or no diversity as to
the course to be pursued on the termination of the correspondence
with General Vives.” In the opinion of Calhoun, “The occupation
of the country in dispute would have followed.” 28 Happily this
was not necessary.
When Congress reconvened in the fall of 1820, the rumors
that the cession had been made were repeated in the London
journals and private letters from Madrid, though the government
had received nothing official on the subject. 29  By the end of
January, 1821, however, there was “no doubt . . . of its approval
by the King with advice and consent of the Cortez.” A policy of
watchful negotiation had paid off. 30
Since the terms in the original treaty had provided that rati-
fication must be exchanged within six months, President Monroe
was forced to place its fate once more in the hands of the Senate.
Senator Walker feared that “unctious politicians, [who] look
with more solicitude to Texas” than to Florida, would impede
its progress. Fortunately these fears did not prove to be correct.
On February 19, 1821, the Senate again gave its approval, this
time with four dissenting votes. These were cast by Senators
James Brown of Louisiana, a brother-in-law of Henry Clay, Rich-
ard M. Johnson of Kentucky, William Allen Trimble of Ohio and
John Williams of Tennessee. 31
With the acquisition of Florida, the next question which be-
came of paramount interest to Alabama’s leaders was the disposi-
tion of the western portion of the area. The Alabama Constitu-
tional Convention, led by Senator Walker and other “Georgians,”
had memorialized Congress praying that so much of the country
as lies west of the Apalachicola River should be added to Alabama
27. Bemis, op. cit., 352.
28. Calhoun to Tait, May 20, 1820, Tait Papers, Montgomery.
29. Walker to Tait, December 17, 1820, ibid.
30. Id. to id., January 28, 1821, ibid.
31. Id. to id., ibid.
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upon the ratification of the treaty of annexation. 32 The memo-
rial pointed out that much of the area lies along the southern
border of Alabama and that Pensacola “must become” the main
seaport for at least the portion of the state “which lies south of
[the] chain of Mountains dividing the waters of the Tennessee
River from that of Mobile Bay.” Unless the area should be given
to Alabama, it held, “2/3’s of Alabama will be blocked by a strip
of territory 50 miles in breadth.”
The convention pointed out that this portion of Florida was
held to be composed of barren soil, while Eastern Florida “appears
of itself sufficiently extensive to form a state.” It requested the
Congress to examine the condition of all concerned. If it did so
and acted accordingly, the convention had no fear as to what the
results would be. 33
Judge Tait sincerely hoped that the Congress would comply
with the request of the convention. “Our Geographical symetry
[sic] will be marred unless this annexation takes place,” he wrote.
He trusted that “the local divisions of this State our northern &
our southern interests will not operate to obstruct a measure
which cannot but be for the interest of this community.” 34
In February, 1821, Senator Walker presented the memorial
of the Alabama Convention to the Senate, where it was referred
to the Foreign Relations Committee. Unfortunately Secretary
Crawford and the other national leaders of the “Georgia” clique
did not identify the cause of their Alabama brethren with their
own, therefore shortly thereafter the Senate committee was dis-
charged from the consideration of the measure. 35
Walker did not give up his struggle, however, nor did his
friends and potential constituents give up hope. In February,
1822, Judge Tait planned the possible rearrangement of his court
sessions should West Florida be added to his district. Since Pen-
sacola was “as healthy in Sept. as in Jany.,” he felt that he could
retreat to it during the sickly season in South Alabama. He hoped
32. In Clarence E. Carter (ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United
States, XVIII, The Territory of Alabama, 1817-1819, (Washington,
1952), 664-666.
33. Ibid.
34. Tait to Walker, November 16, 1821, Walker Papers, Montgomery.
35. Journal of the Senate of the United States of America, 16 Cong.,
2 sess., (Washington, 1822), 211, 217, 226, hereinafter cited as
Sen. Jr.
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the annexation would take place since he deemed it “necessary
for them & for us.” 36
As late as July, 1822, Senator Walker received a request
from J. H. Chaplin as to when a new memorial should be sent to
Congress from the residents of Pensacola. Chaplin reported that
the previous year when he presented a memorial on the subject,
“the measure was unpopular,” and he obtained only about two-
hundred-thirty signers. At the time of his letter, however, he was
convinced that “3/4’s are now in favor” of annexation to Alabama.
He was at a loss as to whether to memoralize the next session or
delay yet another session before presenting another petition to
Congress. 37
In the interim, however, the Senate had passed a bill estab-
lishing a territorial government for Florida. When this measure
was under debate, Walker offered an amendment providing for
the annexation of West Florida to Alabama, which was defeated
25 to 19. Walker and William R. King were joined by only two
other Southern senators in voting for the measure. 38
Walker made “sundry eloquent languages” on the subject
and felt that he had demonstrated that the annexation would be
best for both Alabama and Florida. He received “a great many
fine compliments” for his exertions, but these did not produce
votes for his doomed amendments.
“It failed chiefly from the fears of the South,” he wrote, but
he felt that the failure was only temporary. “It must finally suc-
ceed,” he held. “The Country belongs to us by position and com-
mon interests. Nature has given it to us, and Congress will not
always withhold [it].” Walker found this to be the opinion of
three-quarters of the Senate. The peninsula was “competent of
itself” to become a state, and once this fact became established
36. Tait to Walker, February 22, 1822, Walker Papers, Montgomery.
Tait also requested that if his judicial district were enlarged that he
should receive an increase in salary, so that his stipend would be the
same as that of the Mississippi Judge.
J. H. Chaplin to Walker, July 13, 1822, Walker Papers, Montgomery.
Sen. Jr., 17 Cong., 1 sess., (Washington, 1823), 166-167. The
boundary proposed for the territory to be annexed to Alabama was
as follows: “Beginning at the mouth of the Perdido river; thence,
up the same, to the thirty-first degree of north latitude; thence, along
the said degree of latitude, to the middle of the Chatahouchie river;
thence, along the middle of the said river Chatahouchie, or Apalachi-
cola, to the Gulf of Mexico; thence, westwardly, including all ad-
jacent islands dependent on the late province of West Florida, to
the place of beginning.”
12
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in the statesmen’s minds, “the natural union of West Florida and
Alabama will [be] no longer forbidden.” Though he was con-
vinced that the present “is the best and wisest time” for annexa-
tion, Alabama’s premier senator had to place his faith in the fu-
ture. For once his trust was in vain. 39
The denouement of the Florida saga came in the spring of
1822. On March 8, President Monroe sent a message to Con-
gress, accompanied by documents, advocating the recognition of
the independence of the revolutionary Latin American republics.
Walker felt that there would be no difficulty whatsoever in obtain-
ing House approval. Though the Spanish minister strongly pro-
tested, he felt that the matter would rest there, and that the
Senate would follow the lead of the lower chamber. “Less sen-
sation has been excited by this measure than you would imagine,”
he wrote. “Many great-men, it is said, are ready and willing to
visit these new powers in quality of ambassadors &c.” 40
Senator Walker’s crystal ball proved to be correct. Within
less than two months the independent republics had received
American recognition, and for all practical purposes, the Florida
episode was at an end.
39. Walker to Tait, March 19, 1822, Tait Papers, Montgomery.
40. Id. to id., ibid.
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